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The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) has come under the
scrutiny of the United States Congress due to the size of USARECs operating
budget and the decreasing productivity of its recruiting forces. Many of the
existing incentive problems are caused by the quota based recruiting system. This
thesis examines the potential issues of a monetary based incentive program within
USAREC as a means to increase individual recruiter productivity, which would
allow USAREC to allocate resources more efficiently.
Experiments indicate that simulated monetary bonuses motivate actual
recruiters to increase their estimated recruit production. The authors believe that
the Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model (BIRM) mechanism provides the best
opportunity for efficient resource allocation within USAREC. Therefore, the
authors strongly recommend USAREC to experiment with the BIRM mechanism
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INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) has
come under the scrutiny of the United States Congress due to
the size of USARECs operating budget and the decreasing
productivity of its recruiting forces. Senator David Pryor,
D-Ark. , requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) to
survey military recruiting operations and identify areas in
which the Department of Defense (DoD) could reduce its
recruiting costs without adversely affecting its ability to
meet military personnel requirements. The GAO provided
several recommendations to the military services which could
make the services' recruiting programs more cost effective.
The GAO further recommended the services initiate these
recommendations prior to requesting more funds for additional
recruiters or advertising. One specific recommendation is to
revise the quota based recruiting system which currently
deters recruiters from maximizing their numbers of
enlistments. [Ref . l,p.2 , 68]
Lyons and Reister [Ref .3] identified potential sources of
high unit cost and incentive problems in the current quota
based recruiting system. This thesis is a follow-on to Lyons
and Reister' s thesis. It will focus on the GAO recommendation
concerning the incentive problems of the current quota based
system. It will identify some potential issues of providing
monetary incentives to recruiters based on their individual
performance.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this research is to examine an
alternative incentive mechanism to the current quota based
recruiting system. The research will help determine the
potential issues of a monetary based incentive program within
USAREC as a means to increase individual recruiter
productivity. Such an increase would allow USAREC to allocate
resources more efficiently.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: To what extent will
the introduction of monetary incentives in the recruiting
process increase productivity and reduce incentive problems
and inefficiencies?
The secondary questions are:
1. Are recruiters currently producing below their true
potential?
2. What are the major concerns within USAREC of providing
monetary incentives to recruiters?
3
.
Will a monetary incentive motivate recruiters to
increase their productivity?
4. What are the possible ramifications of implementing a
monetary based incentive program?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of the thesis is to examine the current USAREC
incentive program at the recruiter level. The actual
implementation and management of a monetary bonus system
within USAREC will not be addressed. The experiments
conducted with recruiters were limited to the Northern
California area due to the nature of the experiment and
geographic constraints. A new recruiting strategy titled
"Success 2000" was implemented on 27 September 1994 (during
the writing of this thesis) , therefore the research effort
concentrates on the quota based system prior to the
modifications. Success 2000, however, seems to make only
minor modifications to the quota based recruiting system.
Therefore, there were minimal implications on the conclusions




The research began with further experimentation with the
Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model fBIRM) introduced at the
Naval Postgraduate School. 1 Information necessary for the
experimentation was obtained during meetings and interviews
with local Army recruiters, battalion staff personnel, and
several staff directorates at USAREC headquarters.
Experiments were developed and conducted with students at the
Naval Postgraduate School. Coordination was made with a
recruiting battalion in Northern California to conduct
experiments with actual recruiters.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I is
The Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model (BIRM) was
developed in 1993 by Professor K.L. Terasawa as an alternative
to the quota-based recruiting practice. For detail, see Lyons
and Riester [Ref.3].
an introduction to the thesis. Chapter II provides an
overview of the quota based recruiting system, and a review of
critical problems with the overall recruiting process.
Chapter III identifies some potential issues concerning the
reinvention of recruiting incentives. Chapter IV provides a
discussion of experiments conducted and analyses of the
results. Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations
for further research.
II. QUOTA BASED RECRUITING SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the current quota
based recruiting system and identifies critical problems
associated with this system. The current system is best
described as a centralized system in which quotas are passed
from the Department of the Army level, down to the USAREC
level, and finally down to individual recruiters located in
various recruiting stations. This centralized system does
not take full advantage of local recruiters' potentially more
accurate recruit -market information. In fact, under the quota
based system, such information from the local recruiters tends
to hide the true nature of market potential, and even the
historical data generated under the system become challenging
for proper interpretation. This review of the quota system is
limited to analyzing the recruiter's environment encompassed
within the overall quota based system. Not every element of
the accession process will be examined.
B. REVIEW OF CURRENT QUOTA BASED SYSTEM
The mission of USAREC is to recruit with integrity, high
quality men and women to meet accession and special skill
requirements of the Regular Army and Army Reserve [Ref
.2, p. 3] .
In order to meet Army manpower requirements, USAREC utilizes
a quota based recruiting system.
1.
Background
There are approximately 4,000 recruiters within USAREC
located in over 1,400 recruiting stations throughout the
United States [Ref . 2
,
p. 10] . The quota allocation system is
synopsized as follows: the Department of the Army's Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) generates the required
annual accessions and forwards them to USAREC. To account for
delayed entry program (DEP) losses, USAREC increases this
number by 15 percent. The DEP enables the Army to contract
potential recruits and have them report for training when
training seats become available. The recruit may remain in
the DEP for up to one year [Ref
.3, p. 49]
.
A quota matrix is then created by USAREC which assigns
the quota mission for the four brigades. The brigades
establish the quota mission for the- battalions and recommend
a mission for the companies. The individual recruiter
receives his mission quota from the recruiting station
commander. The quota is based on several variables including
demographics, propensity to enlist, economic conditions, and
previous production. [Ref. 3, p. 50]
Under the quota based recruiting system, the recruiter's
performance rating is primarily a function of his productivity
as compared to his quota. A recruiter's ability to meet his
assigned quota directly affects his Non- Commissioned Officer
Evaluation Report (NCOER) . If he meets his quota, he is
considered successful. If the recruiter continually fails to
meet his quota, he may receive a substandard evaluation report
and possible relief from his recruiting position.
2 . Current Incentive Structure
One incentive USAREC currently uses to motivate
recruiters is the Recruiting Incentive Awards Program,
outlined in USAREC Regulation 672-10. This program is
designed to recognize excellence in recruiting. Award
qualification is based on the accumulation of points from
recruit contracts during a specific time period. Additional
points are awarded for accomplishing assigned monthly quotas
and for overproducing. Table 1 lists the production point
values awarded for various categories of recruits.
CATEGORY POINTS
1 Graduates, Seniors, TSC I-IIIA 20
2 Graduates, Seniors, TSC IIIB 5
3 Prior Service (RA) , TSC I-IIIA, and IIIB 5
4 Prior Service (USAR) 10
5 Non High School Graduates, TSC I-IIIA 5
6 Graduate/Senior TSC IV, Non-grad TSC IIIB/IV
Table 1. Production Point Values After Ref. [4, p.
3
The Basic Recruiter Badge is awarded upon successful
graduation from the Basic Recruiter Course. Table 2 lists the
various achievement stars and the Gold Recruiter Badge awarded
by USAREC. Recruiting awards must be earned in the sequence
shown.
Award Points Maximum Period
1st Gold Achievement Star 240 6 months
2d Gold Achievement Star 300 6 months
3d Gold Achievement Star 300 6 months
Gold Recruiter Badge 300 6 months
1st Sapphire Achievement Star 300 6 months
2d Sapphire Achievement Star 300 6 months
3d Sapphire Achievement Star 300 6 months
Table 2. Various Achievement Awards From Ref. [4, p. 2]
After a recruiter has earned his Third Sapphire
Achievement Star, he is eligible to compete for the Recruiter
Ring. To qualify for the Recruiter Ring, a total of 1200
points must be earned within 24 months. The Recruiter Ring is
the ultimate award under the Recruiting Incentive Awards
Program [Ref
.4, p. 3] . Additional awards include the Commanding
General's Club and the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)
Recruiter of Excellence Award. Both awards are designed to
stimulate overproduction [Ref.5,p.l].
In addition to the Recruiting Incentive Awards Program,
there are other significant factors which motivate recruiters
to achieve their assigned quota. As noted earlier, a
recruiter's NCOER is strongly tied to achieving his assigned
quota; if he consistently achieves his quota, he will be
considered a success. Interviews with numerous recruiters
indicated Non- Commissioned Officer (NCO) professionalism as an
additional motivator.
3. Success 2000
As mentioned in the Scope and Limitations section of the
previous chapter, USAREC recently implemented a recruiting
strategy titled "Success 2000." This strategy involves
developing and introducing state-of-the-art sales management
and processing equipment, and introduces the following
principles
:
1. To simplify the mission and enhance teamwork at
station level for a more efficient, more productive
recruiting force.
2. To expand the authority, autonomy, and flexibility
afforded the recruiting station commander.
3
.
To change the methodology for measuring success to
focus leaders on those essential elements necessary to
achieve success at all levels, thus decreasing the
disparity between a successful USAREC and an
unsuccessful recruiting force. [Ref.6,p.l2]
The first principle of simplifying the mission involves
reducing the number of recruit categories from 20 to three for
the Regular Army (RA) and three for the United States Army
Reserve (USAR)
.
Additionally, quotas are no longer assigned
to individual recruiters. Recruiters will work together to
accomplish a station quota.
Success 2000 views the recruiting station commander (RSC)
as the most critical member of the leadership team.
Therefore, the second principle is designed to empower the
RSC by giving him more authority and flexibility in the
execution of his duties.
The third principle of Success 2000 changes the way
USAREC measures success. Prior to Success 2000, success was
measured at all levels of command solely on the basis of
mission box 2 achievement. However, under Success 2000, units
are evaluated and compared based on the percent of successful
subordinate recruiters and stations.
The Recruiting Incentive Awards Program will remain after
Success 2000 is implemented. Recruiters will still earn
badges, stars, and rings, but the point system to achieve
these awards will be modified. Recruiters will still be
credited points for individual contract accomplishments and
for the station's achievement of its mission.
C. CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE CURRENT QUOTA BASED SYSTEM
The method of operation and management techniques that
USAREC rely upon are in conflict with many of today's
generally accepted management theories. Such conflict may be
divided into two areas: human resource strategy and economic
incentives
.
1. Human Resource Strategy
Today's management theories revolve around a core
concept: "people make it happen." The quota based system
USAREC uses is not designed around this concept. Although the
recruiters ultimately do "make it happen, " they do so with
their careers at risk and in a negative environment.
a. Risk-Averse Working Environment
As noted earlier, under the quota based recruiting
system, the recruiter's performance rating is based upon how
2 Quota which is assigned to individual recruiters and
various levels of command within USAREC.
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well he satisfies the quota. If a recruiter achieves his
quota, he is considered successful. If a recruiter
continually fails to meet his quota, he may receive a
substandard evaluation report and possible relief from his
recruiting position. The performance rating has little to do
with how well he achieves the full market potential. If a
recruiter is assigned an easy quota, he becomes "successful"
with little effort. On the other hand, if he is assigned a
more difficult quota, he may never achieve a "success."
Interviews with several recruiters revealed that the
negative effects of the quota based recruiting system dominate
their working environment. From the recruiter's perspective,
leaders in the various levels of command are often more
concerned with achieving production quotas than with the well-
being of recruiters. This situation seems to create an overly
risk-averse working environment for recruiters.
In Frederick Herzberg's Dual -Factor Theory, he
suggests jobs have dissatisf iers (hygiene elements) and
satisfiers (motivators) . His theory lists hygiene elements as
status, interpersonal relations, quality of supervision,
company policy and administration, working conditions, job
security, and salary. Motivators include challenging work,
achievement, growth in the job, responsibility, advancement,
and recognition. Hygiene elements are core requirements for
virtually any job, while motivators are those elements
designed to enhance job performance. [Ref . 7, p. 434]
The quota based recruiting system that USAREC uses
does not satisfy the conditions specified in Herzberg's Dual-
Factor Theory. Although the system does contain the motivator
elements, it fails to incorporate two critical hygiene
elements: working conditions and job security. The
recruiter's fear of failing to achieve his quota, and the
effects associated with failing have created undesirable
working conditions in a negative working environment.
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Additionally, from the recruiter's perspective, job security
is always in doubt. In fact, USAREC projects 700 total
recruiter reliefs in fiscal year 1994 [Ref.6 ; p.5].
b. Disincentives To Overproduce
The quota based recruiting system is primarily
designed to achieve a predetermined, accession requirement.
However, previous research has revealed that there is an
underlying disincentive for recruiters to overproduce, and an
incentive to "back-pocket" recruits [Ref . 3 ,p. 52] . Recruiters
will withhold a potential recruit once the quota is satisfied,
and will keep him for future quota satisfaction.
Lyons and Reister [Ref .3] , noted recruiters do what
is expected, but lack the incentive to exceed established
production quotas. Additionally, they discovered that since
the penalty for failing to achieve a quota was so great,
recruiters have a strong incentive to induce the system to
lower their quotas. Their research summarized that under the
quota based recruiting system, a recruiter would not maximize
his market potential, but would only attempt to achieve his
quota. Since historical performance is often used to
determine future quotas, recruiters are encouraged to pace
their recruiting effort so as to avoid higher future quotas,
and the potential failure to achieve these higher quotas.
Recruiters in the field and USAREC staff confirmed the





Additionally, Dertouzos [Ref. 8] stated:
. . .analysis assumes that recruiters will
always have incentives to maintain constant levels
of effort and fully utilize available resources.
However, although recruiter success and subsequent
promotion depends on production relative to quota
allocations, the rewards for overproduction may
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not, for a variety of reasons, be sufficient to
induce maximum effort at all times.... Indeed,
preliminary evidence suggests that there may even
exist disincentives to produce. [Ref.8,p.l5]
The GAO report prepared for Senator Pryor revealed
recruiters are not as productive as they could be because of
the quota system, and the system often discourages recruiters
from exceeding their quotas. The GAO report stated:
Overproduction is not rewarded. In fact, in
the current system, a recruiter's overproduction
during one year could result in a rise in the
recruiter's quota for the next year. The higher
quota in subsequent years would require more work
from the recruiter and increase the possibility of
the recruiter's missing a quota and receiving a
career -damaging performance evaluation. These
effects of the quota system and past performance
suggest that recruiters could produce more recruits
than are currently. [Ref . 1
,
pp. 6 , 67]
Frederick W. Taylor, the father of Scientific
Management, stipulated that one of management's basic
responsibilities is to establish legitimate incentives for
work accomplished [Ref. 7, p. 3]. USAREC has developed
incentives such as recruiting badges, stars, and rings to
reward recruiters for work accomplished. However, the quota
based recruiting system creates disincentives to overproduce
and an incentive to back-pocket recruits.
c. Limited Process Ownership
Since the quota based recruiting system is top- fed,
recruiters often do not have a sense of autonomy and process
ownership within the recruiting environment. Interviews with
several recruiters revealed that they desire more personal
responsibility in the execution of their duties. Recruiters
often feel they are pawns in the overall accession process.
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Hackman and Oldham theorized that there are certain
relationships among core job dimensions, critical
psychological states, and on-the-job outcomes. They noted
that essential core job dimensions exist which create critical
psychological states which ultimately result in desirable
personal and work outcomes. The core job dimensions must
include autonomy, feedback, and at least one of skill variety,
task identity, or task significance. These relationships are

































Figure 1. Relationships Among Core Job Dimensions, Critical
Psychological States, and On- The -Job Outcomes From
Ref. [9, p. 631] .
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The research with recruiters revealed that the quota
based recruiting system does provide skill variety, task
identity, task significance, and feedback. However, the
presence of the critical core job dimension of autonomy is
questionable. Hackman and Oldham defined autonomy as:
...the degree to which the job gives the
worker freedom, independence, and discretion in
scheduling work and determining how he will carry
it out. People in highly autonomous jobs know that
they are personally responsible for successes and
failures. To the extent that their autonomy is
high, then, how the work goes will be felt to
depend more on the individual's own efforts and
initiatives - rather than on detailed instructions
from the boss or from a manual of job procedures.
[Ref
.9, p. 632]
The lack of autonomy in the quota based recruiting
system does not develop the critical psychological state of
"experienced responsibility" for outcomes of the work. This
in turn causes the personal and work outcomes illustrated in
Figure 1 to be unattainable.
d. Management By Fear
It appears that fear is a primary tool used by
management within the quota based recruiting system.
Recruiters are continuously reminded of the consequences of
failing to achieve assigned quotas. W. Edwards Deming, a
renowned expert in quality management, developed 14
obligations of management in order to provide a quality
product
.
His eighth point recommends to drive fear out of the
organization, create trust and a climate for innovation
[Ref .10, p. 15]
.
The quota based recruiting system relies on fear and
does not create trust between recruiters and upper levels of
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management. Recruiters are often disillusioned because the
majority of them fail to meet assigned monthly quotas, yet
USAREC consistently meets its overall accession requirements
each year. In fact, more than 80 percent of the battalions
failed to achieve assigned quotas in fiscal year 1993,
although USAREC enjoyed its third most successful recruiting
year in history [Ref .6, p. 13] . Although it is necessary for
USAREC to increase its annual accession objective to account
for DEP losses, this paradox destroys trust between the
recruiters and upper level management
.
2 . Economic Incentives
In today's global marketplace, successful sales
organizations allocate resources based upon up-to-date
accurate information (demand) received from the decentralized
marketplace. The quota based recruiting system prevents
USAREC from utilizing the recruiters who could have the more
accurate local market information. As mentioned earlier, the
quota based recruiting system creates disincentives to
overproduce and incentives to back-pocket recruits. The
system prevents USAREC from determining what individual
recruiters are truly capable of producing. When market
conditions and required end- strength level change, then the
formally optimal quota level no longer remains as such. In
the absence of more accurate information, USARECs task to
allocate scarce resources efficiently and adjust the quotas
using a centralized decision making process has become
exceedingly difficult in a constantly changing environment.
a. Resource Allocation - Location
The most important resource USAREC manages is on-
production recruiters. Roughly speaking, the efficient
16
resource allocation occurs when the marginal production of
each recruiter becomes equal among all recruiting stations.
This is true especially when the marginal costs of deploying
a recruiter is equal across the stations. Given that the
different regions are often characterized by different market
potential, the policy of maintaining national coverage is not
likely to result in efficient use of USAREC resources. The
GAO reported:
DoD maintains an extensive network of
recruiting offices around the United States to
obtain geographic representation for the services.
However, 50 percent of these offices provide less
than 10 percent of the recruits. [Ref.l,p.5]
Jb. Resource Allocation - Quantity
Determining the size of the total recruiting force
is one of the critical decisions that USAREC must make in
achieving the Army's accession requirements. Since USAREC is
unable to determine what each recruiter is truly capable of
producing, it is prevented from accurately calculating the
total number of recruiters required.
Officials at USAREC predict it will become more
difficult to attract, contract, and retain quality personnel
in the future [Ref . 11, p. 17] . In line with this prediction,
Congress authorized more recruiters for the Army. This
decision, however, may not be cost-effective and will not
address the fundamental incentive problems with the quota
based recruiting system.
3. Success 2000
Success 2000 was implemented 27 September 1994, and it is
too early to draw any conclusions at this time. The authors
believe that Success 2000 is a step in the right direction in
17
that it simplifies the quota system and tries to empower the
recruiters. The problem, however, is that Success 2000
remains a quota system where the quota allocation is given by
USAREC down to the recruiting station commander. This will not
alter the potential gaming incentives mentioned earlier for
any quota based recruiting system.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided an overview of the quota based
recruiting system and its critical incentive problems. The
current recruiting system attempts to stimulate production
through various incentives within the quota based recruiting
system. However, the effort does not seem to be working as
evidenced by the need to increase the number of recruiters
despite the fact that the target production number has been
reduced. The problems of the quota system are still evidenced
by the continuing disincentive to overproduce, the use of
management by fear, and the incentive to back-pocket recruits.
If the overall recruiting process continues to be a quota
based system, the negative effects created by this system may
overshadow other positive incentive measures.
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III. REINVENTING RECRUITING INCENTIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on an alternative to the quota based
recruiting system. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the
negative effects created by the quota based recruiting system
may overshadow other positive incentive measures. As a
result, many recruiters do not produce to their true
potential, and this may prevent USAREC from making better
resource allocation decisions. Since the quota based
recruiting system has several critical problems, the authors
believe that significant changes should be made to this system
to enable better resource allocation decisions.
In Vice President Al Gore's National Performance Review,
he challenged the leaders within the federal government to
identify problems, and offer solutions and ideas for savings.
This involved the creation of reinvention laboratories where
experiments in new ways of doing business could be examined.
He stated, "Government must find better, more efficient and
more effective ways to pay for its activities." This occurs
through cutting red tape, measuring results, empowering
customers, and creating competition incentives to create an
environment that rewards success. He also stated that, "We
must discover what the private sector has already embraced:
that more isn't always better, but better is better."
[Ref .12, pp. 1,13, 19]
Two key points from the aforementioned quotes are that
success must be rewarded and "more" is not always better.
This thesis incorporates these points by examining the
possibility of eliminating the quota based recruiting system
and replacing it with a system designed to increase recruiter
19
productivity and provide accurate market information. The
research effort focuses on the use of simulated monetary-
bonuses as the incentive tool.
B. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
The concept of eliminating the quota based recruiting
system and replacing it with a system that incorporates
monetary bonuses may be met with resistance. There are many
examples where people have resisted change, but once the
changes were implemented, they proved to be worthwhile.
1. Human Nature to Resist Change
It is a natural tendency for people to resist change.
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, an acknowledged expert in the study of
change, stated:
But as common as change is, the people who
work in an organization may still not like it.
Each of those "routine" changes can be accompanied
by tension, stress, squabbling, sabotage, turnover,
subtle undermining, behind-the-scenes foot-
dragging, work slowdowns, needless political
battles, and a drain on money and time - in short,
symptoms of that ever-present bugaboo resistance to
change. [Ref . 9 ,p. 675]
2. Example - The All -Volunteer Force
An example of a successful change is the all -volunteer
force. The Vietnam War and anti- draft sentiment led to the
advent of the all -volunteer force. The following quote
provides insight into those turbulent times:
By the late 19 60s, changing demography had
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fundamentally altered the conditions under which
the old draft had operated. No longer, as in the
1950s, would virtually every young man serve in the
military; rather, even during a war, barely half of
them would. The Selective Service System, once a
source of national pride and even affection, had
become a mistrusted institution, composed, in the
popular mind, of fossilized and callous old men.
An institution once thought of as representing the
best in American politics now had the reputation of
representing the worst. [Ref . 13
,
p . 166]
Popular discontent with the Vietnam War and an
improving demographic picture led some leaders to believe that
conscription would no longer be necessary. On 27 March 1969,
President Nixon appointed a commission chaired by Thomas S.
Gates, a former Secretary of Defense, to study the prospects
for an all -volunteer force. The Gates Commission recommended
discontinuing the draft and establishing an all -volunteer
force. This new system was implemented 1 July 1973.
[Ref .13, p. 166]
The concept of the all -volunteer force was an
extremely controversial issue. People resisted the change
from conscription to an all -volunteer force for many reasons.
The quote below categorizes some of the major concerns:
Criticisms of the All -Volunteer Force fall
into four categories, defined by their concerns
with representativeness, numerical strength,
quality, and overall efficiency. [Ref . 13
,
p. 170]
Federal legislators held hearings and debated the
issue of the all -volunteer force. Opponents of voluntary
recruitment believed that an all -volunteer force conflicted
with the democratic ideal of civic duty or that it was
inequitable and inefficient [Ref . 14 ,p. vii] . Senator Edward
Kennedy, D-Mass., as a witness before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on 4 February 1971, stated that he
considered a volunteer Army unwise and inequitable during
21




Today, most Americans view conscription as a thing
of the past and only necessary during a national defense
emergency. In fact, young Americans may find it hard to
imagine anything other than an all -volunteer force. The all-
volunteer force is a viable alternative to conscription in
meeting military personnel requirements, as proven by
successful combat operations within the last decade.
Additionally, a 1993 USAREC publication which chronicled the
first 20 years of the all-volunteer force stated:
Last spring a Gallup poll showed that the
public has more confidence in its military than any
other institution. Now the American people say
nobody does it better, but 2 years ago, when a
volunteer Army was just a campaign promise, the
nation was not so sure about the future of its
armed forces. [Ref. 16, p. 1]
C. MAJOR CONCERNS OF MONETARY BONUSES
When recruiters were introduced to the idea of a system
which incorporates monetary bonuses, they indicated several
concerns. The most common concerns regarding such a system
are addressed in this section.
1. Common Arguments and Concerns
One of the most common arguments is that laws prohibit
paying recruiters bonuses which are based on individual
performance. Another argument is that the general public
would perceive recruiters as "bounty- hunters, " only being
concerned with money. A primary concern is that monetary
bonuses would tarnish the professional image of the recruiter
and the overall image of the United States Army.
Additionally, a concern often mentioned by recruiters is that
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recruiter improprieties would significantly increase. Market
inequities is also often mentioned by recruiters as a major
concern. Finally, paying monetary bonuses to recruiters may
create animosity between mainstream-Army soldiers and
recruiters
.
2 . Discussion of Common Arguments and Concerns
There are laws that currently prohibit the payment of
performance-based monetary bonuses to military personnel.
However, if a more efficient method of operation is
discovered, then these laws should be changed. Vice President
Al Gore, in his National Performance Review, challenged
leaders to discover more efficient and better ways of doing
business. If the payment of monetary bonuses to recruiters
proves to be more efficient, then Vice President Gore's
challenge provides an avenue to possibly change these laws.
Regarding the argument that recruiters will be perceived
as "bounty-hunters," there are two key points that should not
be ignored. First, the key word in "all -volunteer force" is
"volunteer." The decision to enlist rests solely with the
potential recruit. Secondly, the Army maintains stringent
quality standards. The recruiter is not permitted to contract
an unqualified applicant. If the recruiter is limited to
contracting only qualified volunteers, then the perception of
recruiters as "bounty-hunters" should not exist.
The concern that monetary bonuses would tarnish the
professional image of the recruiter and the overall image of
the Army is a strong and valid concern. However, if the
payment of these bonuses proves to be a more efficient method
than the quota based recruiting system, the general public may
come to accept this system. In fact, this system which
incorporates monetary bonuses may give the Army an improved
image of efficiency by investing money now to reduce costs and
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save taxpayer dollars in the future.
A significant increase in recruiter improprieties as a
result of monetary bonuses is often a common concern
mentioned. Currently, under the quota based recruiting
system, recruiter improprieties do occur. From fiscal years
1987 to 1993, there were an average of 226 recruiter
improprieties per year [Ref .17, p. 2] . With a system which
incorporates monetary bonuses, recruiting improprieties will
still exist, but attributing them strictly to monetary bonuses
is debatable. In fact, the concern over a significant
increase in improprieties due to monetary bonuses is also
debatable. A logical argument that arises is the question of
when will a recruiter most likely violate his ethics - to save
his career under the quota system, or to increase his bonus
payment under a monetary based system? Additionally, will a
recruiter commit an impropriety ' and risk foregoing all
potential future bonuses?
The recruiters' major concern of market inequities is
legitimate, as it is recognized that not all recruiting
regions in the country have equal production potential for
recruits. In addition to potentially increasing individual
recruiter production, a system incorporating monetary bonuses
also has the capability to reveal the true market potential
for each recruiting area. Once the actual market potentials
are known, USAREC would be able to allocate recruiters more
efficiently. The issue of monetary bonuses creating
animosity between mainstream- Army soldiers and recruiters is
another major concern. Animosity may exist, but non-
recruiters have the option to become a recruiter if they so
desire. Soldiers do not begin their military careers as
recruiters, they go through a selection process. This process
is designed to accept qualified volunteers and soldiers that




The authors believe that in order for USAREC to become
more efficient, significant changes should be made to the
quota based recruiting system. The research effort focuses on
the use of simulated monetary bonuses as an incentive tool to
potentially increase recruiter productivity and provide
accurate market information. The chapter noted that such a
change may be met with resistance. Additionally, several key
concerns were identified and addressed.
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IV. MONETARY INCENTIVE ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides results of (simulated) monetary
form of BIRM experiments conducted with a group of students at
the Naval Postgraduate School and with a group of actual
recruiters from a Northern California recruiting battalion.
Additionally, a simple flat monetary payment scheme is
examined. Since neither experiment uses any actual money, the
results of the experiment should be viewed as an indicative
rather than a definitive conclusion.
B. MONETARY INCENTIVE MECHANISMS EXAMINED
There are numerous monetary incentive mechanisms that the
experiments could have been based upon, but this research
incorporated two mechanisms that are more easily tied to
individual recruiter production. Additionally, these
mechanisms incorporate the production point values assigned
per category of recruit (based on quality) as outlined in
USAREC Regulation 672-10. The two monetary incentive
mechanisms are a flat -rate method and the Bonus Incentive
Recruiting Model (BIRM) , which was outlined in previous




1. Flat -Rate Method
This mechanism provides the individual recruiter with a
specific dollar amount per point accumulated. A flat-rate
bonus per point would be easily understood by recruiters and
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would be relatively easy to incorporate and manage. However,
this mechanism does not account for market inequities. For
example, two recruiters with the same work effort, located in
different regions of the country, may be rewarded differently
simply because of the regional differences in propensity to
enlist
.
2 . Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model (BIRM)
This model is based on a mechanism developed earlier at
the Naval Postgraduate School. In their thesis, Lyons and
Reister noted that the BIRM would maximize market potential,
reward recruiters equitably in the long run, and provide
important market information to USAREC for better resource
allocation decisions [Ref
.3, p. 46] . This thesis examines this
model by experimenting in simulated and actual recruiter
environments
.
Under the current top- fed quota based recruiting system,
the people that know the market potential best, namely the
recruiters, play a limited role in the quota allocation
process. The BIRM is designed to reverse that flow by
requiring recruiters to forecast their production as
accurately as possible. The recruiter's forecast and actual
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401 ;J6 7 S373 S377 S378 S377 3372 S362 S347 $326 S29-
SOI S409 S413 S424 S428 3430 S428 S422 S412 S395 S372
601 S4S2 S462 S471 S478 S483 S484 S482 S476 $464 $446
701 S494 S506 ssia S52S SS36 S541 SS43 SS41 SS34 S521
801 3536 S551 S565 SS78 S589 S597 S603 S60S $603 SS95
901 S578 S595 S612 3628 $642 S654 S663 S670 S672 S669
1001 S620 S640 S659 S677 3695 S710 S724 S734 1741 S744
Table 3. An Example of a BIRM Incentive Payoff Table.
The bonus a recruiter receives is dependent on both the
actual points produced and the points forecasted. The
monetary bonus is maximized when the recruiter's forecast
matches his actual production for each level of production.
For example, if a recruiter forecasted 50 points and actually
produced 50 points, his bonus would be $430.00. However, if
a recruiter forecasted other than 50 points and produced 50
points, then his bonus is less than $430.00. In other words,
if he knows that his production will be 50 points, there is no
reason to hide his information. Moreover, the table is
constructed so that a higher production is always rewarded by
a higher bonus. If his forecast was 50 points, but he could
make 60 points, then he can gain more by producing 60 points.
Therefore, the bonus table encourages higher productivity and
more accurate forecasting at the same time.
Lyons and Reister [Ref.3] listed the objectives of this
incentive mechanism as:
29
1. Provides an incentive for recruiters to surpass quotas
and thereby maximize true market potential.
2
.
Rewards recruiters with monetary bonuses based on
their work effort and their ability to forecast.
3 Rewards recruiters equitably in the long run despite
inherent regional market differences.
4. Will provide in the long run USAREC headquarters with
valuable market information that will allow for
efficient future resource reallocation to the
productive regions.
5. Will help reduce the tendency for recruiters to delay
or hold applicants for future months thereby improving
market information to USAREC Headquarters.
6. Based on improved forecasting information, the bonus
model will indirectly reduce staff workload and may
minimize the variance in the mission process.
7. The model is adjustable to reflect changing Army
accession requirements.
8. The model is capable of maintaining quality marks.
[Ref.3,pp. 57-58]
The monetary based incentive mechanism should encourage
recruiters to maximize their market potential. Additionally,
the BIRM would help provide USAREC with accurate market
information needed to reallocate resources for more cost-
effective recruiting throughout the country, and at the same
time provide equitable rewards to the recruiters.
C. EXPERIMENTS AT THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
The major purpose of conducting experiments with 40
students at the Naval Postgraduate School was to gain insight
into the patterns of behavior of participants when placed in
simulated production incentive environments. Additionally,
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another purpose was to refine the experiments to ensure they
were satisfactory when conducting future experiments with
recruiters in the actual recruiting environment.
The experiments incorporated three different mechanisms:
a quota based mechanism, a flat -rate incentive mechanism, and
the BIRM mechanism. In each case, the participants were
provided their private information of how likely they could
access a given number of recruits. This information was
provided to them in terms of a recruits- frequency- curve . They
were then asked to respond with how many recruits they could
access under different incentive schemes.
Within the quota based experiment, the participants were
requested to report their likely accession number under
different quota levels of three, four, and five. Under the
flat -rate incentive experiment, the participants were asked
their likely accession number with the understanding that each
accession results in $150.00 payment. In the BIRM experiment,
the participants were asked their likely accession number with
the understanding that payment would be made according to the
bonus payment shown in Table 3
.
The experiments used two different recruits- frequency-
curves (i.e. hypothetical market potential distributions).
Distribution A, as shown if Figure 2, is a normal distribution
with a mean of 3.7 and a standard deviation of 1.6.
Distribution B, as shown in Figure 3, has a similar mean and
a standard deviation of 1.9. These two curves are based on
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1. Quota Based Experiments
There were six quota based experiments that changed not
only the type of hypothetical market potential distribution,
but also the participant's recruiting quota for the month.
a. Distribution A
Three experiments, each with a different quota, were
conducted under this regimen. The details of these
experiments are explained in Appendix A. The authors'
expectations were that the majority of participants would
respond with a production estimate equal to the assigned
quota. The results of these three experiments are summarized
in the pie charts in Figure 4
.
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Recruiting Qnota of 3
4 (12.5%)-,
Recruiting Qnota of 4
5 (5.0%
^-3 (87 5%) "t: (95.0%)
Recmiting Qnota of 5
6 (0.0%) -i
100.0%)
Figure 4. Results of Estimated Production, Distribution A
with Quota of 3, 4, and 5.
The pie charts in Figure 4 show that under a quota
based recruiting system, a combined average of 94.2 percent of
the participants estimated that they would produce the number
equal to their quota, without regard to the market potential.
Jb. Distribution B
Three experiments were again conducted to determine
the effects of different quota levels on the participants'
response, but with a different distribution. The details of
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these experiments are explained in Appendix B. The changes in
the distribution did not alter the main results of the
previous experiment. The majority of the participants still
responded with the assigned quota level as the most likely
estimate of production. The results of these three
experiments are summarized in the pie charts shown in Figure
5.
Recmitiug Qnota of 3
4 (0.0%) -|
Recmitiug Qnota of 4
5 (0.0%)-i
-3 (100.0%) U« (100.0%)
Recruiting Qnota of 5
6 (5.0%) -i 1-4(2.5%)
H5(92.5%)
Figure 5. Results of Estimated Production, Distribution B
with Quota of 3, 4, and 5.
The pie charts in Figure 5 show that under a quota
based recruiting system with Distribution B, a combined
average of 97.5 percent of the participants estimated that
they would produce equal to their quota, without regard to the
market potential.
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2. Flat-Rate Incentive Model Experiments
The experiments for this series were based on monetary-
incentives instead of quotas using the same two distributions
used in the quota experiments. The participants were
instructed that they would receive a monetary bonus of $150.00
per candidate recruited.
a. Distribution A
The details of this experiment are explained in
Appendix C. The authors' expectations were that participants'
production estimates would be significantly higher than the
quota situation. This was because there was no penalty
against making higher production estimates. In fact, they
estimated the production higher than the market warranted.
The authors' expectations were that the majority of
participants would respond with a production estimate of
around four, a level higher than the mean of the distribution.
The results of this experiment are summarized in the pie chart
shown in Figure 6
.
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4 or more recruits
Figure 6. Results of Estimated Production with Flat-Rate
Incentive Model, Distribution A.
The pie chart in Figure 6 shows that under a flat-
rate incentive system with Distribution A, 37.5 percent
indicated a production estimate of four recruits while 58.3
percent indicated an estimate of five or more recruits. This
is remarkable in that there is only less than 30 percent
chance of recruiting five or more recruits. This, however, is
exactly what one should expect from the participants under
this kind of incentive where there is no penalty for
overestimation.
b. Distribution B
The details of this experiment are explained in
Appendix D. The authors expected an even higher production
estimate from the participant, since the probability of higher
production is greater with the more dispersed distribution.
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The results of this experiment are summarized in the pie chart





5 or more recruits
Figure 7. Results of Estimated Production with Flat-Rate
Incentive Model, Distribution B.
The pie chart in Figure 7 confirms the authors'
expectation of a higher production estimate by the
participants. Under a flat -rate incentive system with a more
dispersed distribution, 85 percent of the participants
estimated that they would produce five or more recruits.
Thus, under a simple flat bonus system, the production
estimate tends to be significantly higher than the case of the
quota. In fact, the estimate reported is higher than what the
distribution mean would warrant. This is partly due to the
fact that there is no penalty for the overestimation.
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3 . BIRM Experiments
This series of experiments was designed under the BIRM
incentive framework as shown in Table 3. As with the previous
experiments, two alternate distributions were used to evaluate
the responses.
a. Distribution A
The details of this experiment are explained in
Appendix E. The authors' expectations were that the
participants' production forecasts would be comparable to the
hypothetical market distribution. Since the mean of the
distribution is 3.7 recruits, the authors expected the
majority of the participants to respond with a production
forecast of four. The results' of this experiment are
summarized in the pie chart in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Results of Estimated Production with BIRM
Mechanism, Distribution A.
The pie chart in Figure 8 shows that under a BIRM
system with Distribution A, 40.8 percent of the participants
forecasted that they would produce four recruits. However,
43.3 percent of the participants forecasted that they would
produce five recruits. The large number of participant
forecasts above the mean was a surprise and requires further
analysis and experimentation. This may be due to a very small
difference in overestimations or underestimations
.
b. Distribution B
The details of this experiment are explained in
Appendix F. The authors' expectations were that the
participants' production forecast would be comparable to the
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hypothetical market distribution. Since the mean of the
distribution is 3.8 recruits, the authors expected the
majority of the participants to respond with a production
forecast of four. The results of this experiment are
summarized in the pie chart in Figure 9.




5 or more recruits
Figure 9 . Results of Estimated Production with BIRM
Mechanism, Distribution B.
The pie chart in Figure 9 shows that under a BIRM
system with Distribution B, only 18.3 percent of the
participants forecasted that they would produce four recruits,
and 73.4 percent forecasted that they would produce five or
more recruits. As in the previous results, this result was
puzzling because the underlying distribution translates that
there is only a 38 percent chance that the number of expected
recruits would exceed four.
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4. Summary of Naval Postgraduate School Experiments
The purpose of these experiments with students at the
Naval Postgraduate School was to gain insight into the
students' patterns of behavior when placed in simulated
production environments. The experiments indicated:
1. When placed in a simulated quota based production
environment, the participants almost always estimated
their production would equal their assigned quota,
irrespective of the underlying distribution.
2. When placed in a simple flat payment scheme, their
production estimates were significantly inflated over
what the underlying distribution would warrant. The
forecasts were greater than when they were placed in
either the quota based recruiting environment or the BIRM
environment
.
3. When placed in the BIRM environment, the participants'
forecast became closest to what the underlying
distribution would indicate. However, their forecasts
were still greater than the distribution would warrant.
This was particularly so with the Distribution B.
D. RECRUITER EXPERIMENTS
The major purpose of conducting experiments with
recruiters in their actual recruiting environment was to
determine if monetary incentives would motivate recruiters to
increase their productivity, and to obtain comments and
opinions from recruiters regarding monetary incentives. The
details of these experiments are explained in Appendix G.
These experiments incorporated two mechanisms: the flat -rate
incentive and the BIRM mechanism.
These two mechanisms are similar to those used in the
experiments conducted with the students at the Naval
Postgraduate School. However, the mechanisms were slightly
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modified. Since the recruiters understand the recruiting
process, there was not a need to provide them with
hypothetical market potential distributions or with
descriptions of the recruiting environment. The monetary-
incentive was based on the point structure shown in Table 1 to
account for the various levels of recruit quality, and
monetary payoffs from the bonus table were increased.
The same procedure was used to calculate monetary
bonuses. A recruiter submits a production forecast and his
bonus is maximized when his forecasted points equal his
production points.
The analysis of these two experiments is based on
responses received from 20 recruiters. In these experiments,
recruiters were given detailed instructions and were provided
with conditions of a hypothetical incentive based environment.
These six conditions are listed below:
1. Quality of recruits will remain at recent levels.
2. Current regulations and guidelines covering recruiting
improprieties will remain the same.
3
.
A great deal of administrative work (products of the
top- fed system) will be eliminated.
4. Your performance evaluation will no longer be based on
achieving your mission; it will be based on how your
productivity compares with other recruiter
productivity in your area.
5. The current recruiting incentive awards (badges,
stars, and rings) will remain in effect.
6. Monetary bonuses will be based on the number of
recruits actually accessed, not just contracted.
1. Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis of the experiments was designed
to determine if monetary incentives would increase recruiter
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productivity. This increase in productivity is defined as the
difference between past recruiting performance and production
estimates received from the experiments. Past recruiting
performance is a monthly production average obtained from
fiscal year 1994 Production Reports (Boards)
,
and was
calculated by dividing total fiscal year production by the
number of months the recruiter was on production. The
experiments asked the recruiters to respond with production
estimates for three consecutive months. Production estimates
received from the experiments were calculated by summing the
three estimates and dividing by three to obtain an average of
monthly production estimates. These estimates were then
compared to actual past performance.
a. Flat -Rate Incentive Model
The participants of this experiment were provided
with the production point values for the various levels of
recruits and were instructed that they would receive a
monetary bonus of $10.00 per point. They were asked to
respond with a production estimate of the number of candidates
they would access for three consecutive months.
The authors' expectations were that participants'
production estimates would be greater than their actual past
performance. This is because unlike the quota system, there
is no benefit for understating the true potential. The





RECRUITER PRODUCTION PRODUCTION CHANGE
1 0.64 2.00 214%
2 2.18 3.67 68%
3 1.58 2.67 69%
4 2.18 2.00 -8%
5 1.50 1.67 11%
6 1.00 2.00 100%
7 2.50 4.00 60%
8 0.67 3.00 350%
9 2.91 2.00 -31%
10 1.11 2.00 80%
11 1.33 3.33 150%
12 1.67 2.33 40%
13 2.33 5.00 114%
14 1.86 2.33 25%
15 1.00 1.67 67%
16 0.73 1.00 38%
17 1.82 1.00 -45%
18 2.00 3.33 67%
19 1.00 3.00 200%
20 1.00 2.00 100%
AVERAGE 83%
Table 4. Comparison of Past Performance and Estimated
Performance, Flat -Rate Model.
Table 4 reveals that when the flat -rate incentive
mechanism is used, 85 percent of the participants estimated an





The participants of this experiment were provided
with the production point values for the various quality
levels of recruits and were instructed that they would receive
a monetary bonus based on the incentive payoff table shown in
Table 1. They were asked to respond with a production point
forecast for three consecutive months.
The authors' expectations were that participants'
production forecasts would be greater than their actual past
performance. The authors also expected that their predictions
would not be as large as those under the flat -payment scheme.





RECRUITER PRODUCTION PRODUCTION CHANGE
1 0.64 2.00 214%
2 2.18 3.00 38%
3 1.58 3.00 89%
4 2.18 1.00 -54%
5 1.50 1.00 -33%
6 1.00 2.00 100%
7 2.50 4.00 60%
8 0.67 3.00 350%
9 2.91 2.00 -31%
10 1.11 2.00 80%
11 1.33 3.00 125%
12 1.67 3.00 80%
13 2.33 5.00 114%
14 1.86 2.00 8%
15 1.00 2.00 100%
16 0.73 1.00 38%
17 1.82 2.00 10%
18 2.00 4.00 100%
19 1.00 1.00 0%
20 1.00 3.00 200%
AVERAGE 79%
Table 5. Comparison of Past Performance and Estimated
Performance, BIRM Incentive Mechanism.
Table 5 reveals that when the BIRM incentive
mechanism is used, 80 percent of the participants estimated an
increase in productivity, with an average increase of 79
percent. The results confirmed the authors' expectation.
However, it is not clear at this time that the prediction
under the BIRM reflects the participants true underlying




The experiment gave recruiters an opportunity to provide
their comments and opinions regarding an incentive based
recruiting system. The following comments were received from
recruiters and are representative of all comments and opinions
received:
1. Putting this type of bonus on top of an applicant will
put a bad taste in the community. It would increase
production, but it will become like a bounty-hunter
environment
.
2. I think this system will prove to be valuable to the
command. First of all, it will force the recruiter to
put good quality personnel in the Delayed Entry
Program, knowing they can't get the incentive if DEP
doesn't ship. The only drawback is, there, needs to be
some type of way to continue the teamwork in the
station, because the recruiter will only be concerned
about himself because money is involved.
3
.
I feel that monetary incentives will cause a lot of
integrity problems, and tension within the station
amongst recruiters.
4. Others will say that going to a incentive program like
this will tend to make recruiters hide or conceal
information about an applicant. However, recruiters
are doing it now throughout USAREC and other services.
So if anything, make the penalties harder for those
few recruiters that are concealing information. It
would be a great incentive for the other recruiters
that play by the rules to be able to better compensate
their hard work and loss of time from their families.
Think about it! Civilian company recruiters and




While this system seems to show some signs of
incentive, I think its implementation would greatly
jeopardize USAREC. The system being based on a
monetary benefit invites corruption. Further, it
would tend to foster an every man for himself
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attitude, and would greatly affect unit cohesion.
Further, this type of system would be a powerful
weapon against Army recruiters if put into the hands
of our competition. The ultimate result would be the
loss of trust needed to put young men and women in
boots. If an applicant is led to believe that the
recruiter's only interest in them is monetary it would
be that much more difficult to assist in a career
opportunity.
6. This is a subject that has been debated several times
over the past few years. My immediate concerns are
that the factors that are to be used are fair and
equitable to all recruiters as much as possible.
Also, I hope that we would monitor this system if
implemented, to maintain a good value basis and
integrity foundation to ensure that we continue to
recruit good people with them being thought of first,
last and always. Just don't overshadow the honor of
being a recruiter just because we are giving monetary
incentives (we are great with or without additional
money)
.
Although the majority of recruiters believe that the
monetary incentive system would increase individual recruiter
production, they are seriously concerned with the extra
complications associated with such a monetary based incentive
system. They also raised issues that could undermine the
efficacy of the system.
3. Summary of Recruiter Experiments
The purpose of these experiments with recruiters was to
determine the effect of the monetary incentive system on their
estimate of recruit production. The authors' expectations
regarding an increase in such estimates were confirmed. With
both the flat -rate incentive mechanism and the BIRM mechanism,
the majority of recruiters provided production estimates that
are greater than their actual past performance. The comments
the authors received from these recruiters revealed that
approximately 75 percent of these recruiters (46 out of 62
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total experiments received) oppose a monetary incentive
system.
E. INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY AS A CATALYST
The focus of the research was to examine the
underestimation bias of the quota based recruiting system and
to explore the effects of different incentive systems on the
production estimates. In particular, the authors were
interested in the unbiased estimating feature of the BIRM
mechanism.
In fiscal year 1994, USARECs mission was to access 68,000
recruits with 4,491 recruiters. This equates to 15.14
recruits per year per recruiter. If this average annual
production could be increased by 20 percent, then an annual
production of 18.16 recruits per recruiter could be achieved.
This would allow USAREC to reduce the number of recruiters to
3,743 (68,000 divided by 18.16). Decreasing the number of
required recruiters from 4,491 to 3,743 would allow USAREC to
eliminate 748 recruiter positions from their personnel
authorization document. This results in approximately $24
million savings in military pay for USAREC, using the enlisted
composite pay figure of $32,392 per soldier. There would be
other significant savings in USARECs budget such as recruiter
support and training costs. It is estimated that the monetary
incentive system could be fully funded with approximately 50
percent of the savings generated by the reduction of the
military pay account. The remaining 50 percent of the savings
could be applied toward reducing USARECs overall budget.
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, two incentive mechanisms designed to
increase recruiter production were introduced. These
incentive mechanisms could increase individual recruiter
productivity, and this increase in productivity could allow
USAREC to allocate resources more efficiently. Efficient
resource allocation could lead to decreased costs and
increased savings which could be used to fund the incentive
mechanism. However, a fact which must be further addressed is






The mission of USAREC is to recruit high quality-
personnel to ensure that the Army will be able to successfully
perform its future missions. In order to meet Army manpower
requirements, USAREC currently utilizes a quota based
recruiting system. This quota system has been viewed as
successful since USAREC has achieved its assigned mission
every year since 1980. However, the GAO recently investigated
USAREC due to the size of USARECs operating budget and the
decreasing productivity of its recruiting forces.
The objective of this research was to examine an
alternative incentive mechanism to the current quota based
recruiting system. Chapter I outlined the focus and
organization of the research. Chapter II provided an overview
of the quota based recruiting system and identified critical
problems associated with this system. Chapter III described
the difficulties in implementing significant changes into an
organization and indicated the primary concerns mentioned by
recruiters concerning monetary bonuses. Chapter IV provided





1. Inherent Problems with the Quota System
The research revealed critical problems with the quota
based recruiting system in the human resource strategy and
economic incentive areas. The human resource strategy
problems include an overly risk- averse working environment,
disincentives to overproduce, limited process ownership, and
the use of management by fear. The economic incentive
problems include the inability to efficiently allocate
resources because the true market potential of regions are
masked and hidden by the quota based recruiting system.
2. Simulated Monetary Incentives Indicated an Increase
in Estimated Recruit Production
The authors conducted experiments in two separate
environments: a hypothetical environment with students at the
Naval Postgraduate School, and an experiment with actual
recruiters in their environment. The experiments with
students at the Naval Postgraduate School indicated that the
majority of participants, with the flat -rate incentive and the
BIRM incentive mechanisms, provided production estimates
significantly higher than with the case of the quota based
system. With both the flat -rate incentive mechanism and the
BIRM mechanism, the majority of recruiters provided production
estimates that were greater than their actual past performance
as compared to fiscal year 1994 production statistics.
3 . BIRM Encourages Revelation of True Production
Capab i 1 i ty
The BIRM is designed to require recruiters to forecast
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their production as accurately as possible and encourages the
recruiter to reveal his true production capability. When
placed in a simulated quota based production environment, the
participants almost always estimated their production would be
equal to their assigned quota, irrespective of the underlying
distribution. When placed in a simple flat payment scheme,
their production estimates were significantly inflated over
what the underlying distribution would warrant. Their
forecasts were greater than when they were placed in either
the quota based recruiting environment or the BIRM
environment. When placed in the BIRM environment, the
participants' forecast became closest to what the underlying
distribution would indicate.
4. BIRM Provides the Best Opportunity for Efficient
Resource Allocation
The key elements that lead to efficient resource
allocation are an increase in recruiter productivity and
accurate market information as revealed by the recruiter's
true production capability. Of the three alternative methods
examined in this thesis, only the flat -rate and BIRM
mechanisms indicated an increase in estimated recruit
production. Of these two, only the BIRM mechanism will
provide accurate market information as it is designed to
encourage revelation of true production capability. The BIRM
would help provide USAREC with accurate market information
needed to reallocate resources for more cost-effective
recruiting throughout the country, and at the same time
provide equitable rewards to the recruiters.
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C . RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Further Experiments With BIRM Mechanism
The authors believe that the BIRM is the best mechanism
for USAREC since it provides the greatest opportunity for
efficient resource allocation. The BIRM mechanism would
maximize market potential, reward recruiters equitably in the
long run, and provide important market information to USAREC
for better resource allocation decisions. Although the
authors' experiments indicated that simulated monetary
incentives increased estimated recruit production, these
results were based on only one recruiting battalion and with
hypothetical bonuses offered. To better determine the actual
feasibility of providing monetary bonuses to recruiters, the
authors believe USAREC should further test the BIRM mechanism
and offer actual monetary bonuses to participants in order to
determine recruiters true behavior.
2. BIRM Experiments With Various Incentive Tools
The key to successful implementation of any program
relies heavily upon the acceptance by end-users. Within
USAREC, the end-users of the BIRM mechanism examined in this
thesis would be the on-production recruiters. If further
testing of the BIRM mechanism with monetary incentives reveals
that the majority of on-production recruiters still oppose
monetary rewards as an incentive tool, then other incentive
tools can be incorporated within the BIRM mechanism. The key
point is that the BIRM mechanism still provides USAREC with
the best opportunity for efficient resource allocation. It is
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APPENDIX A. STUDENT EXPERIMENT, QUOTA BASED, DISTRIBUTION A
U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (QUOTA BASED)
The United States Amy Recruiting Command's (USAREC) mission is to
recruit high quality men and women to meet accession and special skill
requirements of the U.S. Army. The current system is quota based; these
quotas are top-fed from USAREC Headquarters, through recruiting command
channels and are eventually assigned to individual recruiters.
For this experiment, you will be an Army recruiter. You will be given
a quota for this month to recruit a specific number of quality recruits. Of
course, your performance evaluation is almost solely dependent on meeting
your monthly quota. Consistently meeting your assigned monthly quota is
considered successful, and failing to meet the quota may result in receiving
substandard efficiency reports or relief from your duty position. It is
important to note that your future quotas are based on your historical
recruiting performance (recruiting more than your quota could result in a
higher future quota and possible failure to meet the higher quota).
The graph below depicts the projected market potential of your
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Number of Recruits
Your recruiting quota for this month is 3 recruits.
How many candidates will you recruit this month?
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U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (QUOTA BASED)
The United States Army Recruiting Command's (USAREC) mission is to
recruit high quality men and women to meet accession and special skill
requirements of the U.S. Army. The current system is quota based; these
juotas are top- fed from USAREC Headquarters, through recruiting command
rnannels and are eventually assigned to individual recruiters.
For this experiment, you will be an Army recruiter. You will be given
a quota for this month to recruit a specific number of quality recruits. Of
rourse, your performance evaluation is almost solely dependent on meeting
/our monthly quota. Consistently meeting your assigned monthly quota is
ronsidered successful, and failing to meet the quota may result in receiving
substandard efficiency reports or relief from your duty position. It is
important to note that your future quotas are based on your historical
recruiting performance (recruiting more than your quota could result in a
ugher future quora and possible failure to meet the higher quota) .
The graph below depicts the projected market potential of your
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Number of Recruits
Your recruiting quota for this month is 4 recruits.
How many candidates will you recruit this month?
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U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (QUOTA BASED)
The United States Army Recruiting Command's (USAREC) mission is to
recruit high quality men and women to meet accession and special skill
requirements of the U.S. Army. The current system is quota based; these
quotas are top- fed from USAREC Headquarters, through recruiting command
channels and are eventually assigned to individual recruiters.
For this experiment, you will be an Army recruiter. You will be given
a quota for this month to recruit a specific number of quality recruits. Of
course, your performance evaluation is almost solely dependent on meeting
your monthly quota. Consistently meeting your assigned monthly quota is
considered successful, and failing to meet the quota may result in receiving
substandard efficiency reports or relief from your duty position. It is
important to note that your future quotas are based on your historical
recruiting performance (recruiting more than your quota could result in a
higher future quota and possible failure to meet the higher quota).
The graph below depicts the projected market potential of your

























2 3 4 5
Number of Recruits
Your recruiting quota for this month is 5 recruits.
How many candidates will you recruit this month?
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APPENDIX B. STUDENT EXPERIMENT, QUOTA BASED, DISTRIBUTION B
U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (QUOTA BASED)
The United States Array Recruiting Command's (USAREC) mission is to
recruit high guality men and women to meet accession and special skill
requirements of the U.S. Army. The current system is quota based; these
quotas are top- fed from USAREC Headquarters, through recruiting command
channels and are eventually assigned to individual recruiters.
For this experiment, you will be an Army recruiter. You will be given
a quota for this month to recruit a specific number of quality recruits. Of
course, your performance evaluation is almost solely dependent on meeting
/our monthly quota. Consistently meeting your assigned monthly quota is
considered successful, and failing to meet the quota may result in receiving
substandard efficiency reports or relief from your duty position. It is
important to note that your future quotas are based on your historical
recruiting performance (recruiting more than your quota could result in a
higher future quota and possible failure to meet the higher quota).
The graph below depicts the projected market potential of your
recruiting area for this month. On the average, you should be able to

















Your recruiting quota for this month is 3 recruits.
How many candidates will you recruit this month?
_
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U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (QUOTA BASED)
The United States Army Recruiting Command's (USAREC) mission is to
recruit high quality men and women to meet accession and special skill
requirements of the U.S. Army. The current system is quota based; these
quotas are top-fed from USAREC Headquarters, through recruiting command
channels and are eventually assigned to individual recruiters.
For this experiment, you will be an Army recruiter. You will be given
a quota for this month to recruit a specific number of quality recruits. Of
course, your performance evaluation is almost solely dependent on meeting
your monthly quota. Consistently meeting your assigned monthly quota is
considered successful, and failing to meet the quota may result in receiving
substandard efficiency reports or relief from your duty position. It is
important to note that your future quotas are based on your historical
recruiting performance (recruiting more than your quota could result in a
higher future quota and possible failure to meet the higher quota).
The graph below depicts the projected market potential of your
recruiting area for this month. On the average, you should be able to
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Your recruiting quota for this month is 4 recruits.
How many candidates will you recruit this month?
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U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (QUOTA BASED)
The United States Army Recruiting Command's (USAREC) mission is to
recruit high guality men and women to meet accession and special skill
requirements of the U.S. Army. The current system is quota based; these
quotas are top-fed from USAREC Headquarters, through recruiting command
channels and are eventually assigned to individual recruiters.
For this experiment, you will be an Army recruiter. You will be given
a quota for this month to recruit a specific number of quality recruits. Of
course, your performance evaluation is almost solely dependent on meeting
your monthly quota. Consistently meeting your assigned monthly quota is
considered successful, and failing to meet the quota may result in receiving
substandard efficiency reports or relief from your duty position. It is
important to note that your future quotas are based on your historical
recruiting performance (recruiting more than your quota could result in a
higher future quota and possible failure to meet the higher quota).
The graph below depicts the projected market potential of your
recruiting area for this month. On the average, you should be able to
recruit anywhere from one to seven recruits on a somewhat equally likely
basis.
PROJECTED MARKET POTENT! AL
Frequency
yn 1/1 1/1 \42 V7
3 4 5
Number oi Recruits
Your recruiting quota for this month is 5 recruits.
How many candidates will you recruit this month?
_
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APPENDIX C. STUDENT EXPERIMENT, FLAT-RATE INCENTIVE, DISTRIBLTTION A
U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (INCENTIVE BASED)
The United States Army Recruiting Command's (USAREC) accession
system is now based on monetary incentives instead of quotas.
For this experiment, you will be an Army recruiter. You must
evaluate the market potential of your recruiting area (based on the
graph below), and determine how many candidates you think you will
recruit for this month. For this experiment, you must respond
between one and seven recruits.
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Number of Recruits
Your incentive is based on a flat rate of $150.00 per candidate
recruited.
My estimate for this month is recruits.
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APPENDIX D. STUDENT EXPERIMENT, FLAT-RATE INCENTIVE, DISTRIBLrriON B
U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (INCENTIVE BASED)
The United States Army Recruiting Command's (USAREC) accession
system is now based on monetary incentives instead of quotas.
For this experiment, you will be an Army recruiter. You must
evaluate the market potential of your recruiting area (based on the
graph below), and determine how many candidates you think you will
recruit for this month. For this experiment, you must respond
between one and seven recruits (on the average, you should be able
to recruit anywhere from one to seven recruits on a somewhat
equally likely basis).
PTOJBOH) MPKET POT^fll fit
Frequency
Your incentive is based on a flat rate of $150.00 per candidate
recruited.
My estimate for this month is recruits.
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APPENDIX E. STUDENT EXPERIMENT, BIRM INCENTIVE, DISTRIBUTION A
U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (INCENTIVE BASED)
The united States Army Recruiting Command ' s (CSAREC) accession
system is now cased an monetary incentives instead of quotas; the
incentives are determined by a forecast, bid and actual recruit
"production . "
for this experiment, you will still be an Army recruiter. Ycu
no longer have a quota, but you now have direct inpur into the
accession process. You must evaluate the market potential of /our
recruiting area (based on the graph below), and make a monthly
production forecast. For this experiment, your bid must be between
one ana seven recruits (on the average, you should still be able to
recruit four candidates;.








Your payment will be your base pay plus a bonus payment from the tar^
beiow .based on your forecast and actual producation for the month).
MONTHLY BONUS TABLE




1 1 21 3 4 5 6
II 110 1 10SJ 101 91 75 56 321
21 153
1 155 153 147 136 121 101|
31 196 1 203| 205 203 196 136 1701
41 240 ;soj 2ST 259 257 250 240 1|
51 2S3 293 ( 309 315 317 31S 309l|
61 326 34SJ 361 372 373 380 3731
71 369 393 | •»' 428
1
4331 445 44711
Using the incentive payoff table in conjunction with the graph of
your marxet potential, submit a forecast for the number of candidates
you will recruit this month.
Mv rcrecas- for this month is recruits.
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APPENDIX F. STUDENT EXPERIMENT, BIRM INCENTIVE, DISTRIBUTION B
U.S. ARMY RECRUITING EXPERIMENT (INCENTIVE BASED)
The United States Array Recruiting Command's (USAREC) accession
system is now based on monetary incentives instead of quotas; the
incentives are determined by a forecast bid and actual recruit
"production.
"
For this experiment, you will still be an Army recruiter. You
no longer have a quota, but you now have direct input into the
accession process. You must evaluate the market potential of your
recruiting area (based on the graph below), and make a monthly
production forecast. For this experiment, your bid must be between
one and seven recruits (on the average, you should be able to
recruit anywhere from one to seven recruits on a somewhat equally
likelv basis) .
Fraquancy
PFQJBTIH3 MFKET POBJT1 PL
Your payment will be your base pay plus a bonus payment from the table
below (based on your forecast and actual production for the month).
MONTHLY BONUS TABLE
Number Forecasted by Recruiter
2 3 4 5 6 7|
1 110 108 101 91 75 56 32
Actual 2 153 155 153 147 136 121 101
Number 3 196 203 205 203 196 186 170
Recruited 4 240 2501 257 2S9 257 250 24o|
5 283 298 309 315 317 315 309
6 326 345 361 372 378 380 378
7 369 393 412 428 438 445 447
Using the incentive payoff table in conjunction with the graph of
your market potential, submit a forecast for the number of candidates
you will recruit this month.
My forecast for thxs month is recruits.
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APPENDIX G. RECRUITER EXPERIMENT
NAME
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
THESIS SURVEY OF U.S. ARMT RECRUITERS
The attached surveys are for thesis research for two U.S. toy
officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California. The officers are currently working with two professors
who are conducting research for USAREC Headquarters.
In an effort to improve the recruiting process, this survey is
designed to help determine if process ownership, monetary
incentives, and the elimination of the top-fed mission recruiting
system will allow recruiters to increase productivity.
Incentive based environments rely on positive rewards for a
job well done, as opposed to top-fed systems which depend on
negative actions when assigned missions are not achieved. Although
it is quite alarming for most people to imagine recruiters
receiving a bonus for assessing recruits, it is a proven fact that
money is an extremely effective motivator. Recruiters are the most
important link in the recruiting process and must be truly
motivated by the incentive offered to increase productivity. An
increase in recruiter productivity will allow the government to
save money in the long run.
While taking part in the following surveys, imagine that the
current mission system has been eliminated and you are new
operating in an incentive based environment.
In this new environment, the following conditions would exist:
1) Quality of recruits will remain at recent levels.
2) Current regulations and guidelines covering recruiting
improprieties will remain the same.
3) A great deal of administrative work (products of the top-
fed system) will be eliminated.
4) Your performance evaluation will no longer be based on
achieving your mission; it will be based on how your productivity
compares with other recruiter productivity in your area.
5) The current recruiting incentive awards (badges, stars,
and rings) will remain in effect.
6) Monetary bonuses will be based on the number of recruits
actually assessed, not just contracted.
IMPORTANT NOTE: The two attached surveys are independent and are
designed to examine two separata monetary incentive methods. Do
not attempt to compare them.
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RECRUITER SURVEY NUMBER ONE
This monetary incentive method is based upon the points
currently awarded under USAREC Regulation 672-10. Shown below are
the points awarded for different categories of recruits.
Overproduction point values no longer exist since monthly missions
are no longer assigned.
CATEGORY ACRONYM POINTS
1 Graduates, Seniors, TSC I-IIIA GSA,CA 20
2 Graduates, Seniors, TSC IIIB GSB , CB 5
3 Prior Service (RA), TSC I-IIIA, and IIIB PA,PB,PS 5
4 1 Prior Service (USAR) PS 10
5 Non High School Graduates, TSC I-IIIA HA,NA 5
6 Graduate/Snr TSC IV, Non-grad TSC IIIB/ IV G4,S4,HB
H4,NB,N4
For this survey, you will not receive a monthly mission. You
are completely responsible for your personal productivity. You
must evaluate your current recruiting market and determine how many
candidates you are capable of assessing in three consecutive
months. You must keep in mind that USAREC has quality standards to
maintain, therefore the number of low quality recruits assessed
will be controlled by USAREC in accordance with its overall
accession requirements (do not respond with a higher number of low
quality recruits than you assessed in the past)
.
The incentive awarded will be $10.00 per point. For example,
a GSA results in a bonus of $200.00, etc. Place the number of
candidates (by category) you will assess for three consecutive
months in the table below.
CATEGORY MONTH 1 MONTH 2 MONTH 3 1
GSA, CA !
GSB, CB





RECRUITER SURVEY NUMBER TWO
This monetary incentive method is also based upon the points
currently awarded under USARE C Regulation 672-10 (see table on
survey number one). Overproduction point values no longer exist
since monthly missions are no longer assigned.
For this survey, you will not receive a monthly mission.
You are completely responsible for your personal productivity.
You must evaluate your current recruiting market and determine
how many candidates you are capable of assessing in three
consecutive months. You must keep in mind that USAREC has
quality standards to maintain, therefore the number of low
quality recruits assessed will be controlled by USAREC in
accordance with its overall accession requirements (do not plan
on recruiting a greater number of low quality recruits than you
assessed in the past).
The monthly incentive award will be based on the table shown
below. For this type of bonus method, you will be required to
submit a monthly point forecast. The bonus you will receive is
dependent on the actual points produced (assessed) and the
points you forecast. Your monthly bonus is maximized when your
production points equal your forecasted points. For example, if
you forecast 50 points and actually produce 50 points, your bonus
would be $430.00. However, if you forecast 50 points, and only
produce 30 points, your bonus would only be $324.00.




1 10 20 30 40 so 60 70 80 90 1 100
101 5241 S24C 5236 S229 S213 5202 5181 S1S4 sua 574
201 S293 S234 S283 S279 S271 S2S9 S241 S213 S1S8 S149
301 5335 S329 S330 S329 S324 S31S 33C2 S233 S2S- 3223
401 S36T S373 S377 S373 S377 S372 S362 5347 S326 S297 ,
SOI S409 S413 S424 S423 S430 5423 S422 S412 5395 S372
601 S4S2 S462 S471 S478 S483 S484 5482 S476 S464 S446
701 5494 SS06 S513 S528 SS36 SS41 SS43 SS41 S534 ss:;
301 SS36 5551 S565 3S"3 SS89 5597 S603 S60S S603 5595
901 S5-3 SS95 S612 S623 5642 5634 S663 S670 S672 S669 1
100! S620 S640 S65?
|
S677 S695 S710 S724 S734 S741 5744 ;
what are your point forecasts for three consecutive months?
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3
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RECRUITER SURVEY FEEDBACK SHEET
Please take a few moments to tell us your concerns, ideas, or
comments regarding these surveys and/or the concept of providing
mcnetarv incentives to recruiters.
Thank you for your time. The individual results of these
survevs will be handled in a confidential manner.
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